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May 08, 2005

ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-05)

6月5~8日、カナダのバンクーバーで、Association for Computing Machinery(ACM)のTHE SIXTH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC-05)が開かれる。

スポンサーになっているのはACMのSpecial Interest Group on Electronic Commerce(SIGECOM)だ。会場はVancouver Marriott Pinnacle resort。学会としてのプログラムのほか、チュートリアルとワークショップがある。

私としてはかなりの分野違いだが、目を離せないのは、今関心を持っている予測市場関連のテーマが少なからず取り上げられているからだ。David PennockやDavid Wellmanといった当該分野で知られた研究者が活発に活動しているということもあるが、e-commerceの中にもともと予測市場と親和性の高い特性があるのだろう。


1) Optimal Mechanism Design without Priors - Jason Hartline
2) Trading Agent Design and Analysis - Michael P. Wellman

1) Polynomial Time Algorithms for Market Equilibria
- Kamal Jain and Vijay Vazirani
2) Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges
- Tuomas Sandholm

この中で一番気になるのが最後に出ているcombinatorial auction(組み合わせオークション)だ。複数の対象に対して値をつけた組み合わせで入札するもので、別に予測市場に限定されたものではないのだが、予測市場における情報の効率性を向上し、少人数の参加者で市場を運営するためのテクニックとして複数の予測市場研究者が注目している。ただし「NP完備性に関する理解が条件」とのことで、かなりハイレベル。


Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions - David Pennock and Kursad Asdemir

Sponsored Search Auctionsに関するワークショップだ。詳しくないがネット界隈でホットな話題、なのではないだろうか。ちなみにだがDavid PennockはYaHoo! Research LabsのSenior Research Scientistで、予測市場の世界ではかなり知られた人だ。



08:30 - 10:10
Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms
Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz

Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Michael Saks, Lan Yu

Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games
Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham

Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value
Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan

10:10 - 10:40: BREAK

10:40 - 12:20
Interconnected Communication Networks Provisioned Selfishly
Pedro Ferreira, Marvin Sirbu

Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing
Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker

Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks
Nicolas Christin, Andreas Weigend, John Chuang

A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters
Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang

12:20 - 02:00: LUNCH

02:00 - 03:00 Invited Speaker: Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

03:00 - 03:30: BREAK

03:30 - 05:10
Nearly Optimal Multi Attribute Auctions
Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann

Optimal Design of English Auctions with Discrete bid Levels
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Nicholas Jennings, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus

Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan

Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods
MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David Parkes


08:30 - 10:10
First-Price Path Auctions
Nicole Immorlica, David Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami

From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions
Robert McGrew, Jason Hartline

True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs
Edith Elkind

Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi

10:10 - 10:40: BREAK

10:40 - 12:20
Graceful Service Degradation (or, How to Know your Payment is Late)
Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon

Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking
Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, Chen Zhang

Dynamic and Secure B2B E-contract Update Management
Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul Grefen

Secure Distributed Human Computation
Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine

12:20 - 02:00: LUNCH

02:00 - 03:00 Invited Talk: Jennifer Rexford, Princeton University

03:00 - 03:30: BREAK

03:30 - 05:10
Communication Complexity of Common Voting Protocols
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions: Demand Queries and Ascending Auctions
Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan

Fairness and Optimality in Congestion Games
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay Vazirani

Congestion Games with Failures
Maria Polukarov, Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz


08:30 - 10:10
ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan

Self-Selection, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of Negative Feedback at eBay
Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick

Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison
Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David Pennock

Integrating Tradeoff Support in Product Search Tools for E-Commerce Sites
Pearl Pu, Li Chen

10:10 - 10:40: BREAK

10:40 - 11:55
Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments
Ahuva Mu'alem

Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General Framework
MingYang Kao, XiangYang Li, WeiZhao Wang




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